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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether the sensitivity of corporate investment to internal funds
depends on the firm's acces to a main bank, using the sample of Japanese manufacturing
firms constructed by Hayashi and Inoue (1991).  For either of two classifications of firms
by their access to a main bank, there is no evidence that main bank ties mitigate the
sensitivity of investment to the firm's liquidity.  The large effect of main bank ties reported
in Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) is most likely due to the relatively poor quality
of their capital stock estimate.
Author's address: Department of Economics, Tokyo University, Tokyo 113, Japan
email: hayashi@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
 For a q model of investment with the pecking order of corporate finance, see Hayashi (1985).1
 See, for example, Myers and Majluf (1984).2
 See, Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994) for a survey of the literature on the main bank system.3
 Okazaki and Horiuchi (1992) report for a sampleof 38 Japanese firms that the effect of liquidity is smaller (but not significantly4
so) for firms with main bank ties.  The investment equation they estimate, however, does not include q.
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1. Introduction
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature exploring the link between corporate investment and
internal funds.  In the idealized world of no information asymmetries and no taxes, it is immaterial how
investment is financed.  If future profitability is properly controlled for, by including Tobin’s q in an
equation explaining investment, investment should not be sensitive to the firm’s liquidity.  There are two
explanations for why investment can be excessively sensitive to the firm’s liquidity.  The traditional
explanation is that there is a pecking order in the source of investment finance.  With taxes providing the
interest deductibility for debt finance at the corporate level and preferential treatment of capital gains over
dividends at the personal level, retention is the cheapest source of finance, followed by debt and then new
share issues.  Investment will be excessively sensitive to the firm's liquidity because the cost of investment
finance depends on the level of investment.  The more modern explanation is the agency models featuring1
the incentive problem faced by managers or the information asymmetry between managers and sharehold-
ers.2
It is an increasingly popular view that the Japanese main bak system, with its intensive monitoring
of the firm's activities, is an institution to overcome the information problems.  The view leads to the3
prediction that corporate investment for firms with strong ties to a main bank should be less sensitive to
liquidity than for those without.  The most widely-known empirical evidence is the q-based equation
estimated in Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991).  They examine two sets of firms derived from4
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Nakatani’s (1984) study of Keiretsu: those firms affiliated with Japanese K iretsu (which they called group
firms) and those that have no such affiliation (independent firms).  They argue that the close bank relation-
ship enjoyed by group firms is likely to mitigate the inform problem.  Consistent with this view, they find
evidence for the differential liquidity effect, namely that investment is much less sensitive to measures of
liquidity for group firms than for independent firms.  Their sample period is 1977-82, the period before the
substantial liberalization of the stunted Japanese corporate bond market.
Hayashi and Inoue (1991), too, examined the liquidity effect in a q-based investment equation
using micro data on Japanese firms.  They find that the liquidity effect exists only for domestic firms
producing non-traded goods, which is consistent with the view that the apparent liquidity effect is merely
proxying the firm’s market power.  As will be explained in the next section, there are good reasons to
believe that he data set used by Hayashi and Inoue is of much higher quality than that used by Hoshi et.
al. (1991).  Hayashi and Inoue, however, did not divide the sample according to main bank ties.  The main
purpose of this paper is to see whether the large differential effect reported in Hoshi t. al. (1991) can be
found in the data set used by Hayashi and Inoue (1991) for the same sample period of 1977-82.
The content of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes the two micro data sets on firms to be
used in this study.  One is the Hayashi-Inoue data set just mentioned.  The other is the data set described
in Hoshi and Kashyap (1990).  The sample used in Hoshi et. al. (1991) is a subset of an earlier version of
this second data set.  Because some of the independent firms in Nakatani’s (1984) classification may well
have main bank ties, we will entertain an alternative and more direct classification of firms, used in
Campbell and Hamao (1994) and described briefly in Section 2, which checks whether the bank with the
largest loan share for the firm in question is one of the city, trust, or long-term credit banks.  In Section 3,
we estimate a q-based investment equation for subsamples divided according to the classifications of
Nakatani and Campbell-Hamao.  Our results basd on the Hayashi-Inoue sample indicate that the differen-
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tial liquidity effect between group and independent firms is much smaller than is reported in Hoshi et. al.
(1991) and disappears completely if extreme cases are removed.  The large differential effect is indeed
found for the Hoshi-Kashyap sample, but the result should be discounted because of its small sample size
and the allegedly poor quality of the investment data.  These and other conclusions are contained in Section
4.
2. The Data
2.1. Two Micro Data Sets on Japanese Manufacturing Firms
In this study we use two existing micro data sets on Japanese manufacturing firms for estimating the
investment equation for 1977-1982.  The first is the data set used in Hayashi and Inoue (1991).  Their
sample consists of 687 manufacturing firms.  It is a subset of the 942 manufacturing firms listed on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in 1977.  The subset is obtained by eliminating (i) those that ceased to be
listed by 1986 (62 firms), (ii) those whose stocks were suspended for trading around the beginning of
accounting year between 1977 and 1986 (2 firms), (iii) those that changed the fiscal year by 1986 (142
firms), (iv) those that acquired other traded firms (48 firms), and (v) one firm (Fuji Kosan) with a massive
change in the capital stock between 1977 and 1986.
Hayashi and Inoue constructed the variables for analysis (such as investment, the capital stock,
Tobin’s q) from the company reports compiled by Japan Development Bank (JDB).  The JDB data base
is very detailed on the composition of the company’s assets, which allows us to obtain the following
information needed to carry out the perpetual inventory calculation of the capital stock.  First, the change
in the gross capital stock can be divided betw en new acquisition of assets and sales of existing assets, and
there is enough information to estimate the reproduction value of those assets sold by the firm.  Therefore,
investment can be calculated as new acquisitions of physical assets less the reproduction value of assets
  For more details, see the Appendix of Hayashi and Inoue (1991).5
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sold.  Second, investment can be broken down between five asset types.  From this information, Hayashi5
and Inoue (1991) construct the capital stock for each asset type by the perpetual inventory method
calculation.  The physical depreciation rates for the calculation are taken from Hulten and Wykoff (1979),
the standard source for depreciation rates.  The starting y ar of the calculation is 1962 (or the year the firm
is first listed if it comes after 1962).  The sample statistics for selec ed variables are reported in Table 1
along with a fairly detailed definition of those variables.
The other micro data set is the one described in Hoshi and Kashyap (1990).  Their sample consists
of 580 manufacturing firms.  It is a sub et of the 972 manufacturing firms listed on the TSE in 1989.  The
subset is obtained by eliminating (i) those that were not continuously listed between 1964 and 1989, (ii)
those that were involved in mergers or spin-off, (iii) those whose shares were suspended for trading around
the begining of accounting years, and (iv) those that have had an absolute value of their estimate of
Tobin’s q greater than 50.  Hoshi and Kashyap constructed the variables for analysis from the Nikkei
Financial Data tapes, which have much less information about the asset composition than available from
the JDB data base.  A very indirect method must be used to estimate investment because there is no data
on gross capital stock.  Also, total investment cannot be broken down between asset types.  Thus we would
expect he capital stock estimates in the Hoshi-Kashyap data set to be far less reliable than those in
Hayashi and Inoue (1991).
There are 197 firms that are in the Hayashi-Inoue sample but not in the Hoshi-Kashyap sample.
This is mainly because requirement (i) in the Hoshi-Kashyap sample is considerably stronger than (i) in the
Hayashi-Inoue sample.  On the other hand, there are 90 firms in the Hoshi-Kashyap sample that are not in
the Hayashi-Inoue sample.  This is because of the requirement for the Hayashi-Inoue sample that there be
  Apart from the tax adjustment due to accounting depreciation, the q in Hayashi-Inoue inflates the ratio of the market value of6
the firm to the reproduction cost of the firm by a factor of 1/(1–J), where J is the corporate tax rate.  See their formula (2.18) with
(2.2).
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no change in the fiscal year.  The intersection of the two samples has 490 firms.  For those 490 firms, both
the Hayashi-Inoue data set and the Hoshi-Kashyap data set have information on I/K, Tob n's q, and the
cash flow rate.  To compare the quality of the two data sets, Table 2 show the sample statis ic for those
three common variables.  Because the definition of cash flow cannot be much different between the two
data sets, the difference in the estimate of the cash flow rate (the ratio of cash flow to the capital stock) is
due to the different capital stock estimates.  The high mean cash flow rate in the Hoshi-Kashyap data set
must mean that its capital stock is much smaller on aver ge than in the Hayashi-Inoue data set.  The reason
that the mean of Tobin's q is slightly higher in Hayashi-Inoue despite its larger capital stock estimate is
probably due to the difference in the way tax adjustment on q is performed.  Despite the fact that the mean6
is similar between the two data sets, the standard deviation of q is much larger in Hoshi-Kashyap, which
strongly suggests that the capital stock in the Hoshi-Kashyap data et is poorly measured.   This conclusion
is reinforced by the fact that the Hoshi-Kashyap sample was obtained after dropping those firms whose q
is less than 50 in absolute value.
2.2. Two Classifications by Main Bank Status
To estimate the investment equation for varius sub-samples distinguished by the firm’s access to the main
bank, we need information about the firm’s main bank status.  We use two different classifications.
Campbell and Hamao (1994) determine whether the firm has a main bank or not based on the bank loan
information.  For each firm,they find the bank with the largest outstanding loan balance.  If the bank with
the largest loan share is one of the 19 city, trust, and long-term credit banks, the firm is presumed to have
main bank ties.  Otherwise the firm has no main bank.  We use their classification for 1983/84.  This
Iit /Kit ' "t % $qit % (CFit % uit
Iit Kit qit
CFit uit
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dichotomous classification will be referred to as the Ham o classification.
The second classification is derived from Nakatani's (1984) study of Keire su.  Those firms
deemed by Nakatani to belong to one of the six Keiretsu (Mitui, Mitsubishi, Dai-Ichi, Sumitono, Fuyo,
Sanwa) will be referred to as the group firms.  Those deemed independent will be referred to as th
independent firms.  The remaining firms in the Nakatani classification are either subsidiaries or those
deemed unclassifiable.  Hoshi et. al (1991) examined the difference in investment behavior between group
firms and independent firms.
For those firms included in the Hayashi-Inoue sample, the relationship between the two classifica-
tion schemes is as in the cross-tabulation in Table 3.  For group firms, there are far more firms with main
bank ties than those without.  This is what we would expect, because Keiretsu is centered around a big
bank having strong ties with the other firms in the same Keiret u in the form of loans and cross-share
holdings.  It is noteworthy, however, that a substantial fraction of independents have a main bank according
to the Hamao classification.
3. Main Bank Ties and Investment
3.1. Investment Equation
In this section, we examine investment behavior for various subsets of firms defined by the two classifica-
tion schemes just described.  The investment equation we estimate is of the standard variety:
  (t = 1977,..., 1982),
where  is investment for firm  in year t,  is the capital stock at the beginning of the year,  is
Tobin's q at the beginning of the year,  is the cash flow rate, and  is the error term.  A more detailed
 See Hayashi and Inoue (1991) for a fuller discussion.7
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definition of the variables is in the note to Table 1.  In particular, the firm's cash flow is defined as after-tax
earnings plus accounting depreciation less dividends.  This is a standard measure of the firm's liquidity.
The cash flow rate CF is the ratio of cash flow to the capital stock.  If dividends were not deducted from
cash flow, CF would be equal to the gross profit rate.  The intercept in the investment equation is allowed
to vary over time while the coefficients are constrained to be the same over time.
The investment equation with ( = 0 can be derived from the standard q-theo y of investment with
adjustment costs and perfect competition.  In the q-theory, the error term u is an unobservable variable that
shifts the adjustment cost schedule.  Given this u, optimal investment depends only on q, which summarizes
all the information about future profitability relevant to the firm’s investment decision.  However, even if
the model is correct, the OLS estimate of the CF coefficient in the regression of I/K onq and CF can be
significant for a number of reasons.  First, the error term u affects adjustment costs and hence profits and7
cash flow.  So cash flow is a function of u and can be correlated with u.  Second, for the same reason, q
can be correlated with u.  Even if the cash flow rate CF were uncorrelated with u, it can pick up a
significant coefficient through its correlation with q.  Third, if, as is highly likely in micro data, q is
measured with error, the classical errors-in-variables problem arises and q is correlated with u.  Again, CF
can enter the equation with a significant coefficient.  This point -- that the liquidity variable can be
significant under the q-theory -- is not sufficiently well appreciated in the literature, but is duly noted by
Hoshi et. al. (1991).  They don't claim that the mere significance of CF is evidence for the liquidity effect.
They claim, correctly, that the differ ntial effect of the liquidity variable CF b tween the two sets of firms
facing different information and incentive problems can be taken as evidence for the liquidity effect.
3.2. Group vs. Independent Firms
uit uis t  s
 Since the two samples are independent, the (asymptotic) variance of the difference is the sum of the variance of the point8
estimate from group firms and the variance of the point estimate from independents.  Thus the asymptotic standard deviation of
the difference is the square root of the sum of standard errors.
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Following Hoshi et. al. (1991), we first examine the group and independent firms, the two distinct subsets
in the Nakatani classification.  As shown in Table 3, of the 687 firms in the Hayashi-Inoue sample, there
are 191 group firms (that is, the intersection of Nakatani's group firms and the Hayashi-Inoue sample has
191 firms) and 55 independent firms.  Table 4 displays the simple statistics.  Measured by the size of the
capital stock, independent firms are on average larger than group firms.  The (gross) profit rate is higher
for independents, which corroborates the point made by Nakatani (1994).  Also, the independent firms
grow faster (as indicated by the higher mean of I/K) and have higher q.
Table 5 displays the estimated investment equation for the two subsamples (for the time being,
ignore the last column).  For each subsample, two estimation techniques are used.  The first is the straight
pooled OLS.  The OLS standard errors, however, can be biased because the method does not take into
account the serial correlation in the error term (the correlation between  and  for ).  The OLS
standard errors reported in he table incorporates the serial correlation (see the Appendix for the formula).
The second method is the standard fixed-effects estimator.
It is useful to start with the fixed-effects estimates, because that is the estimation technique used
by Hoshi et. al. (1991) in their estimation of the investment equation.  For group firms both q and the cash
flow rate (CF) are significant, while for independents CF dominates q.  The CF coefficient for group firms
of 0.3826 is substantially higher than that for independe ts of 0.2051.  The t value for the difference is 2.1,
significant at 5%.  Therefore, the qualitative result of Hoshi et. al. (1991) -- that the liquidity effect is8
stronger for independents than for group firms -- is reproduced in the Hayashi-Inoue sample, although the
magnitude of this differential effect of liquidity is not as great as might be expected from their fixed-effects
 For example, the transformed value of the cash flow rate is CF  - (CF +...+ CF ).9 it  i,77 i,82
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estimate of their investment equation shown in Table II of Hoshi et. al. (1991).
This result, however, is a fragile one.  If the estimation method is the pooled OLS, the opposite
result emerges.  The liquidity effect, measured by the coefficient of the cash flow rate, is now weaker for
independent firms.  For either group, q is no longer significant.
Why the choice of estimation technique makes so much difference for coefficient estimates,
particularly for independents?  For independents, the sample size is only 55, so only a few extreme firms
may be pulling the regression coefficients in strange directions and this may be more serious in the fixed-
effect estimation.  To address this concern, Figure 1 plots I/K against the cash flow rate CF for independ-
ents, treating firm-years as observations (so the sample size is 330 (= 55×6)).  Figure 2 is a plot of the
deviation of the firm-year from the time average, which is the transformation for the fixed-effects estima-
tion.  As clear from the plot, there are four extreme firm-years.  To illustrate the influence of thos9
extreme cases, the last column of Table 5 shows the parameter estimates for independents excluding the
three firms (which are: the Green Cross, Chuo Paperbound, and Kato Works) that produced the four
extreme firm-years in Figure 2.  The large liquidity effect in the fixed-effects estimation disappears.  Now,
for both the OLS estimate or the fixed-effect estimate, the liquidity effect is lower for independents.
Mechanically, it is easy to see from the plot why the parameter estimates are so sensitive: the extreme firm-
years lying far above the other observations pull the regression line up.  But for those firm-years the firm
was able to finance large investment when liquidity was low, a strong sign that the firm was not constrained
by liquidity.  Indeed, these three firms have a main bank according to the Hamao classification.  It would
be of some interest to examine how these three firms financed the large investment outlays.  It is ironic that
the very evidence for the lack of the liquidity effect helps raise the cash flow rate coefficient.
 The sample used by Hoshi et. al. (1991) has 121 group firms and 24 independents.  The difference arises from the fact that10
the sample from which these firms are extracted is an earlier version of the Hoshi-Kashyap data set (according to a privat
communication with Takeo Hoshi).
- page 10 -
It is possible that those firms with large investment expenditure despite relatively low cash f ow
were able to finance investment out of liquid assets.  Unfortunately, the Hay shi-Inoue data set does not
have the variable designated in the firm’s financial statements as liquid assets.  It does have information on
financial assets excluding stocks of affiliates.  I  the liquidity measure is the sum of cash flow and financial
assets excluding affiliates’ stocks at the beginning of the period and if CF is redefined as the ratio of this
measure to the capital stock, then the OLS estimate of the CF coefficient is 0.0031 (standard error =
0.0027) for the 191 group firms and 0.0062 (standard error = 0.0023) for the 55 independents.  The fixed-
effects estimate is 0.0898 (standard error = 0.0070) for group firms and 0.0695 (standard error = 0.0082)
for independents.  Again, there is no significant differential effect of liquidity, although we hasten to add
that not all of the firm’s financial assets may be liquid.
The evidence presented so far casts serious doubts on the robustness of the results reported in
Hoshi et. al. (1991).  In their investment equation, Hoshi et. al. (1991, Table II) include as measures of
liquidity not only the cash flow rate (CF) but also the stock of short-term securities.  We include only the
cash flow rate because it is a more standard specification of the literature and also because graphical
analysis as done above is easier with just one measure of liquidity.  The other difference between our
analysis and that of Hoshi et. al. is, of course, that we are using different (and, in all likelihood, better)
data.
We don't have the same data set used by Hoshi et. al. (1991), but we can create something close
to it from the Hoshi-Kashyap data set of 580 firms described briefly in the previous section.  If, as in Hoshi
et. al. (1991), we require the end of the firm's fiscal year to be March, there are 104 group firms and 25
independents.  Sample statistics for I/K, q, CF and the ratio of the stock of short-term securities to the10
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capital stock (which are all the variables included in the Hoshi-Kashyap data set made available to me) are
shown in Table 6. As in Table 4, independents grow faster and are more profitable, but unlike in Table 4
and somewhat puzzling, q is higher for group firms.
Parameter estimates of the investment equation by the pooled OLS and the fixed-effects technique
are in Table 7.  Now the differential effect of liquidity is much more pronounced than in Table 5, particu-
larly for the fixed-effect estimate.  The plot of I/K against CF is in Figure 3.  There are no obvious extreme
cases, but still for a large number of firm-years investment exceeds cash flow.
3.3. Sample Split by Hamao's Classification of Main Bank Ties
The presumption in the use of the Nakatani classification is that group firms should have stronger main
bank ties than indpendents.  Probably a better measure of main bank ties is the Hamao classification, which
is based on bank loans.  Of the 687 firms in the Hayashi-Inoue sample, 678 are lso in Hamao's sample
(see Table 3).  Sample statistics for those with and without a main bank are shown in Table 8.  Here, in
contrast to the sample split by the Nakatani cl ssification shown in Table 4, those without a main bank are
smaller in terms of both sales and the capital stock, but as in Table 4 for independent firms, they are
growing faster, and more profitable.  Despite the substantial differences in the average characteristics, the
parameter estimates of the investment equation are very similar between the two subsamples, as shown in
Table 9.  This is true for both the pooled OLS and the fixed-effects estimates.  There is absolutely no
evidence for the differential effect of liquidity between those with and without a main bank.
4. Conclusion
We have examined whether the excess sensitivity of investment to liquidity depends on the firm's access to
a main bank.  For either of the two main bank classifications we examined, there is no evidence for the
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differential liquidity effect.  The large differential effect found for the Hoshi-Kashyap sample is most likely
due to its poor quality of the capital stock estimate.
This does not mean that liquidity does not play any role for investment.  It probably does.  The
message of this paper is that access to a main bank neither increases nor decreases the excess sensitivity
of investment to liquidity.  This can be interpreted in two ways.  It is probably not the case that the main
bank system is an institution to overcome the failure of the capital markets.  Rather, the system is an
alternative to the capital markets.  It, too, has to deal with the incentive problem arising from asymmetric
information, albeit in a different way.  The other interpretation is that the traditional reasons having to do
with taxes are more important than the incentive story for explaining the excess sensitivity.  The two
interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
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Table 1
Sample Statistics, Hayashi-Inoue Sample (n = 687), 1977-82
mean s.d. min max
Sales, in billion 1982 yen 112.9 267.1 1.0 3261.0
Cash flow, in billion 1982 yen 6.0 17.8 -34.4 327.8
capital stock, in billion 1982 yen 38.1 136.1 0.2 2624.6
I/K (investment-capital ratio) 0.108 0.124 -0.801 1.336
q (Tobin's q) 0.426 1.298 -10.115 18.279
Gross profit rate 0.185 0.170 -0.780 2.343
CF (cash flow rate) 0.155 0.152 -0.780 2.251
Note: Sales, cash flow, and the capital stock are converted into real terms by the GDP deflator.  Cash flow is defined as after-tax
earnings plus accounting depreciation less dividends.  The capital stock is the beginning-of-the-year value of depreciable assets (struc-
tures, buildings, transportation equipments, machinery, and instruments & tools).  In the notation of Hayashi and Inoue (1991), it is
the sum over assets of PK·(1–*)K, where K is the real capital stock of the asset at the end of previous period, PK is the tax-unadjusted
price of the asset, and * is the physical depreciation rate.  q is defined as (2.18) of Hayashi and Inoue (1991).  The gross profit rate
is the ratio of the sum of after-tax earnings and accounting depreciation to the capital stock.  The cash flow rate, CF, is the ratio of
cash flow to the capital stock.  The differ nce between the gross profit rate and the cash flow rate, therefore, is the dividend to capital
ratio.
The sample is pooled across years.  Therefore, the sample size for the statistics are 4,122 (= 687×6).
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Table 2
Intersection of Hayashi-Inoue and Hoshi-Kashyap Samples (n = 490), 1977-82
Hayashi-Inoue Hoshi-Kashyap
mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max
I/K 0.113 0.123 -0.708 1.336 0.178 0.214 -0.518 3.465
q 0.399 1.102 -7.250 10.958 0.348 4.377 -31.10437.363
CF (cash flow rate) 0.157 0.138 -0.695 1.363 0.303 0.249 -1.637 2.109
Note: See note to Table 1 for the definition of the variables.  As in Table 1, the statistics are for the sample pooled across the sample
years 1977-82.
Table 3
How Two Classifications Cut Hayashi-Inoue Sample
Hamao Classification
In Hayashi-Inoue




group firms 162 28 1 191
independents 31 24 0 55
subsidiaries 14 2 0 16
unclassifiable 298 115 7 420
In Hayashi-Inoue but not in
Nakatani
4 0 1 5
total 509 169 9 687
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Table 4
Group Firms and Independents in the Hayashi-Inoue Sample
Group Firms (n = 191) Independents (n = 55)
mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max
Sales 183.3 292.8 5.2 2473.5 189.0 470.1 8.1 3261.0
Cash flow 9.4 17.7 -34.4 179.1 11.8 37.4 -3.1 327.8
Capital Stock 57.5 129.2 1.4 1716.2 79.0 333.0 2.1 2624.6
I/K 0.100 0.102 -0.557 1.061 0.118 0.127 -0.184 1.106
q 0.308 1.052 -7.250 10.539 0.751 1.414 -1.542 10.958
gross profit rate 0.167 0.131 -0.628 0.748 0.241 0.215 -0.297 1.576
CF (cash flow rate) 0.141 0.118 -0.692 0.677 0.200 0.183 -0.297 1.363
Note: The statistics are for the sample pooled across the sample years 1977-82.
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Table 5
Parameter Estimates of the Investment Equation
Subsample
Group firms Independents Independents
n = 191 n = 55 n = 52
Parameter estimates by OLS
Coefficient of q 0.0042 0.0071 0.0052
(0.0033) (0.0056) (0.0079)
Coefficient of CF 0.3044 0.2462 0.2297
(0.0296) (0.0477) (0.0501)
Parameter estimates by the Fixed-Effects Method
Coefficient of q 0.0114 -0.0094 0.0294
(0.0045) (0.0104) (0.0092)
Coefficient of CF 0.2051 0.3826 0.1895
(0.0417) (0.0744) (0.0607)
Note: Year dummies are also included in the regression to account for time-dependent intercepts.  The sample
of independents in the last column excludes the three firms (the Green Cross, Chuo Paperbound, Kato Works)
which produced the extreme firm-years in Figures 1 and 2.
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Table 6
Group Firms and Independents in the Hoshi-Kashyap Sample
Group Firms (n = 104) Independents (n = 25)
mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max
I/K 0.160 0.171 -0.305 1.596 0.197 0.231 -0.078 1.454
q 0.465 4.184 -14.763 19.820 0.341 3.714 -6.640 16.551
CF (cash flow rate) 0.279 0.244 -0.879 1.400 0.383 0.317 -0.052 2.109
Short-term securities0.733 0.672 0.082 9.231 0.812 0.730 0.080 3.897
divided by capital
Note: The statistics are for the sample pooled across the sample years 1977-82.
Table 7
Parameter Estimates of the Investment Equation
Subsample
Group firms Independents
n = 104 n = 25
Parameter estimates by OLS
Coefficient of q 0.0014 -0.0019
(0.0019) (0.0054)
Coefficient of CF 0.2697 0.3308
(0.0307) (0.0599)
Parameter estimates by the Fixed-Effects Method
Coefficient of q 0.0113 -0.0141
(0.0038) (0.0092)
Coefficient of CF 0.0605 0.6235
(0.0368) (0.1091)
Note: Year dummies are also included in the regression to account for the time-dependent
intercept.
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Table 8
Firms with and without a Main Bank in the Hayashi-Inoue Sample
Has Main Bank (n = 509) No Main Bank (n = 169)
mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max
Sales 123.3 287.6 1.0 3261.0 83.8 197.8 1.1 2473.5
Cash Flow 6.3 19.6 -34.4 327.8 5.1 11.3 -1.6 133.5
Capital Stock 44.9 156.3 0.2 2624.6 19.1 34.5 0.4 242.0
I/K 0.103 0.118 -0.801 1.106 0.124 0.142 -0.708 1.336
q 0.346 1.142 -10.115 10.958 0.692 1.641 -4.720 18.279
gross profit rate 0.166 0.148 -0.780 1.576 0.239 0.215 -0.695 2.343
CF 0.141 0.134 -0.780 1.363 0.198 0.190 -0.695 2.251
Note: The statistics are for the sample pooled across the sample years 1977-82.
Table 9
Parameter Estimates of the Investment Equation
Subsample
Has Main Bank No Main Bank
n = 509 n = 169
Parameter estimates by OLS
Coefficient of q 0.0087 0.0062
(0.0021) (0.0038)
Coefficient of CF 0.3261 0.2865
(0.0180) (0.0315)
Parameter estimates by the Fixed-Effects Method
Coefficient of q 0.0064 0.0104
(0.0029) (0.0056)
Coefficient of CF 0.2854 0.2887
(0.0224) (0.0437)
Note: Year dummies are also included in the regression to account for the time-dependent
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intercept.
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Appendix: Calculation of Standard Errors
The investment equation for six years for firm i can be written compactly as
   (i = 1,..., n),
where n is the number of firms in the sample and
 = ,   = 
 = ,  = .
The pooled OLS estimate of * can be written as
 = .
Let  /  be the residual vector associated with this estimator.  The 6×6 variance matrix Var( )
can be estimated as
.
The asymptotic variance of  can be consistently estimated by
asymptotic variance of = .
The standard errors are the square root of  times the diagonal elements of this matrix.
